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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v,
Case No. 920248-CA
Priority No. 2

ROBERT TODD WHITE,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992 Repl. Vol.)
provides this Court's jurisdiction over this non-capital, non-first
degree felony criminal conviction from the district court.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE
Did the search warrant affidavit provide probable cause for
the no-knock nighttime search warrant?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In assessing this issue, this Court should read the search
warrant and affidavit "in a common sense manner and as a whole,"
State v, Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah App.)(citation omitted),
cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), and determine whether the
affidavit establishes probable cause for the no-knock nighttime
warrant.

Constitution of Utah, Article I section 14. The standard

of review of the search warrant affidavit is discussed further in
Point I of this brief.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Appendix 1 to this brief contains the full text of the
following controlling constitutional and statutory provisions:
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
Utah Constitution, Article I section 1
Utah Constitution, Article I section 7
Utah Constitution, Article I section 14
Utah Code Ann. section 77-1-3(4) (1991 Cum. Supp.)
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-1 (1990 Repl. Vol.)
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-2 (1990 Repl. Vol.)
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-3 (1990 Repl. Vol.)
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-4(1) (1990 Repl. Vol.)
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-5(1) (1990 Repl. Vol.)
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-6 (1990 Repl. Vol.)
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-10(2) (1990 Repl. Vol.)
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-12 (1990 Repl. Vol.).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State originally charged Mr. White with one count of
unlawful possession of a controlled substance with the intent to
distribute (R. 16-17).
Defense counsel moved to suppress evidence seized in
violation of Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the
fourth amendment to,the United States Constitution (R. 21-24).
After an evidentiary hearing and the submission of memoranda by the
parties, the trial court entered a memorandum decision denying the
motion to suppress (R. 66).
Mr. White entered a no contest conditional plea to one
count of possession of a controlled substance, explicitly reserving
the right to appeal the trial court's denial of the motion to
suppress (R. 73, 76-82).

The trial court sentenced Mr. White to a
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term of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison and fined Mr.
White $5,000, but then suspended all but $500 of the fine (with a
25% surcharge), and placed Mr. White on probation for eighteen
months (R. 86-87).

The trial court stayed this sentence pending

this appeal, granting a certificate of probable cause (R. 86, 94-95).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A magistrate issued a no-knock nighttime search warrant for
evidence of drug possession and intent to distribute on the basis of
an affidavit submitted by Detective Bill McCarthy, which apparently
was not clarified or supplemented on the record prior to the
issuance of the warrant.

A copy of the search warrant and affidavit

contained in the district court pleadings file are in Appendix 2 to
this brief.
The no-knock nighttime search warrant was to be executed
on the premises known as a 3720 South 3375
West, the duplex on the west side of the road,
372 0 is the southern most half of the duplex, the
apartment to the north has the numbers 3718 on
the front of the premises, to include all
containers, rooms, attics, and basements found
therein.
(R. 25).
The affidavit indicates the names of two occupants of the
premises to be searched (as determined by utility company records)
and mentions vehicles belonging to other occupants at the premises
to be searched (R. 32), but alleges no probable cause as to which
occupant(s) of the premises to be searched was/were involved in
illegal drugs (R. 28-34).
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The affidavit seeks the warrant to search for evidence of
possession of illegal drugs, and possession with intent to
distribute, on the basis of the detective's personal observation of
what he viewed as vehicular traffic consistent with drug trafficking
near the premises to be searched ("vehicles arrive and stay a very
short period of time"), and on the basis of information from two
confidential sources.

The first confidential source had not

witnessed any drug transactions in the premises to be seized, but
was married to someone "the spouse," who allegedly bought cocaine at
the premises to be searched over a six month period prior to the
search, and had driven the spouse to the premises to be searched
when the spouse obtained cocaine, and had been told by the spouse
that persons inside the premises to be searched were the spouse's
source of cocaine.

The second confidential source had seen the

spouse of the first confidential source at the premises to be
searched and knew of the spouse's history of cocaine abuse (R.
30-31).

The affidavit also mentions a "second family member" who

had indicated that the spouse had a cocaine problem and had admitted
to buying cocciine from the premises to be searched (R. 31) .
The ciffidavit indicates that the first confidential source
was reliable because the source's experiences were first hand and
personal, becciuse the source had not been promised or paid anything,
and because the source was corroborated by information provided by
the second source (R. 30) .
The affidavit indicates that the second confidential source
was reliable because the source's information was first hand,
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because the source was a relative of the spouse, and because the
spouse had an arrest record involving drug offenses.
The affidavit does not make any indication as to the
reliability of the second family member.
The affidavit and warrant seek authorization to search for
and seize drug paraphernalia, packaging supplies and records,
residency recordsf and currency in proximity to drugs (R. 26) . The
warrant does not seek to search for or seize any drugs (R. 26) .
Nevertheless, the affidavit alleges that a no-knock warrant was
necessary because "the property being sought pursuant to this
warrant/affidavit is very easily destroyed."

(R. 33).

The affidavit also alleges as justification for the
no-knock warrant that "more and more narcotics dealers are arming
themselves to protect the sales operations from other
dealers/users," that the detective firmly believed no-knock searches
to be safer in drug cases, and that the supplier had threatened the
spouse in the event of police intervention (R. 33). The pre-printed
portion of the affidavit indicates that a no-knock search was
necessary because, "physical harm may result to any person if notice
were given; or the property sought may be quickly destroyed,
disposed of, or secreted.

This danger is believed to exist because:

SEE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN BODY OF AFFIDAVIT." (R. 34).
The affidavit alleges that a nighttime search was necessary
because the busiest time of drug trafficking was in the evening
hours (R. 32). The pre-printed portion of the affidavit indicates
that the nighttime search was necessary "because there is reason to
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believe it is necessary to seize the property prior to it being
concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered or for other good reason
to wit: SEE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN BODY OF AFFIDAVIT." (R. 34).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Because of the danger posed by no-knock nighttime searches,
and the concomitant need for adequate assessment of affidavits
seeking no-knock nighttime search warrants, this Court should hold
under Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution that no
deference is afforded to magistrates on review of the issuance of
no-knock nighttime search warrants.
When reading the affidavit in this case "in a common sense
manner and as a whole," Rowe, supra, this Court can see that the
affidavit fails to establish probable cause for the issuance of the
no-knock nighttime search warrant.

Facial flaws and discrepancies

in the warrant and affidavit that were never clarified by the
magistrate prior to the issuance of the warrant preclude a finding
of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.

The

affidavit fails to establish the statutory predicates for the
issuance of a no-knock nighttime search warrant.
The foregoing problems with the affidavit and warrant
preclude a finding of a "substantial basis" for affirming the
magistrate under federal standards.
Because the "barebones" affidavit was patently inadequate
to justify the issuance of the no-knock nighttime search warrant,
the search cannot be justified under the federal "good faith"
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exception to the exclusionary rule, which does not apply under the
Utah Constitution.
The evidence seized pursuant to the no-knock nighttime
search warrant should be suppressed.

ARGUMENT
I.
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT DEFER TO THE MAGISTRATE,
BUT SHOULD REVIEW THE AFFIDAVIT SEEKING A
NO-KNOCK NIGHTTIME SEARCH WARRANT FOR PROBABLE CAUSE.
Under the fourth amendment, the United States Supreme Court
has indicated that reviewing courts are to grant a magistrate's
issuance of a search warrant great deference and review for a
"substantial basis" for the issuance of the warrant, rather than for
probable cause, theorizing that if reviewing courts scrutinize
warrant affidavits too closely, that will somehow discourage police
from seeking warrants prior to conducting searches.

See Illinois v.

Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983).
The biggest problem with the deference afforded to the
magistrates by the United States Supreme Court is that this
deference undercuts the critical role of meaningful judicial review
in enforcing citizens' rights to privacy.

The historical importance

of meaningful judicial review of the issuance of warrants can be
appreciated through review of the appendix to State v. Rowe. 806
P.2d 730, 740-743 (Utah App. 1991), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327
(Utah 1991).

Police officers preparing search warrant affidavits

and magistrates issuing warrants are most likely to do the best job
of upholding the constitutions if they are stimulated to do so by
-7 -

meaningful judicial review.

Id. at 743.

Rather than requiring

police and magistrates to follow the constitutional requirements of
securing search warrants based on probable cause prior to searches,
with the "substantial basis" test, the United States Supreme Court
tacitly informs police officers and magistrates that if the officers
and magistrates will at least file the paperwork before the
searches, the courts may be willing to look the other way if the
paperwork is substantively lacking in probable cause.

See State v.

Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 835 (Utah App. 1991)(Orme, J. concurring)("The
stated reason [for deferring to the magistrates7 probable cause
finding] ... is to encourage the use of warrants.

...

It should be

reason enough to rigidly require the use of warrants that the
Constitution requires them and further requires that they be
supported by probable cause.")(citations omitted).
Another problem with the deference afforded to the
magistrates by the United States Supreme Court is the vagueness of
the "substantial basis" test.

Search warrants should only issue if

the search warrant affidavits establish probable cause, by asserting
facts that would lead a reasonable person to believe that there is
"a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place."
(1983).

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238

Yet under the United States Supreme Court's standards,

reviewing courts are to read the affidavits for a "substantial
basis" for the issuance of the search warrants and are expressly not
to review for probable cause.
test is abstruse.

Id. at 236.

The "substantial basis"

"Either an affidavit establishes probable cause
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or it does not."

State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 836 (Utah App.

1991)(Orme, J., concurring).
Under the Utah statutory scheme, it cannot be said that
magistrates should be deferred to because they develop expertise
through repeated exposure to search warrant affidavits.

See State

v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830f 835 (Utah App. 1991)(Ormef J.
concurring)(noting hypothesis that deference to magistrates might be
justified by their expertise developed through repeated experience
with search warrant affidavits).

In seeking search warrants, police

may approach any justice, judge, or justice of the peace in this
state.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-3(4) (1991 Cum. Supp.)(allowing all

judges and justices of any court to act as magistrates).

As the

Court reviewing many search warrant affidavits, and as the Court
composed of seven magistrates, this Court is in a position to take
judicial notice of the fact that Utah magistrates do not uniformly
have the opportunity to develop expertise in issuing search
warrants.

It appears that those magistrates with the most

experience in evaluating the affidavits obtain that experience
because the police most often solicit search warrants from these
select magistrates.

Judicial review is most important in these

circumstances, to insure the neutrality and detachment of the
magistrates.
The scope of information available to the magistrates does
not provide a basis for deferring to the magistrates.

See State v.

Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 835 (Utah App. 1991)(Orme, J.
concurring)(noting hypothesis that deference to magistrates might be
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justified because magistrates have the opportunity to clarify
affidavits whem they are presented, and appellate courts may not be
privy to the information available to the magistrate, but stating,
"On the other hand, such explanations should be made of record even
if only by appropriate interlineation of the affidavit.11).

Under

the Utah statutory scheme, magistrates are allowed to receive
evidence in support of search warrants in written form or to record
the evidence verbatim and have the record transcribed.
Ann. § 77-23-4(1) (1990 Repl.).

Utah Code

In these circumstances, the

magistrates should not be privy to information unavailable to
reviewing courts.

The fact that the magistrates have the statutory

opportunity to clarify on the record evidence in support of search
warrants demonstrates that Utah magistrates have the opportunity to
insure the propriety of the issuance of search warrants, and are not
somehow handicapped in comparison to reviewing courts.
Under the Utah statutory scheme, it cannot be said that
magistrates should be deferred to because they are at an
institutional disadvantage and lack the resources of reviewing
courts.

See State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 835 (Utah App.

1991)(Orme, J. concurring)(noting hypothesis that deference to
magistrates might be justified because magistrates operate at an
institutional disadvantage, with less time and fewer resources than
are available to appellate judges.).
opportunity to forum shop.

In Utah, police have the

Every justice, judge and justice of the

peace is authorized to act as a magistrate.

The fact that the

police may choose to patronize the magistrates with the least
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resources is reason for meaningful appellate review, rather than
reason for deference to the magistrates.

Further, evaluation of

search warrant affidavits does not require great resources—it
simply requires a thoughtful reading of the affidavits and
clarification on the record when necessary.

A lack of magisterial

resources provides no justification for compromising the fundamental
constitutional rights at stake in search and seizure cases.
It appears that none of the United States Supreme Court
cases directing reviewing courts to defer to the magistrates
involves no-knock nighttime search warrants.

This country has a

long history of reprobation of no-knock nighttime searches.

See

Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498-500 (1958); Miller v.
United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306-08 (1958).

No-knock nighttime

search warrants pose extreme dangers to searching officers and
others inside or near the premises to be searched and involve an
extreme intrusion into the privacy and solitude of the home.

See

State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 734 n.5, 738-40, and nn.10 and 11,
(Utah App.)(main opinion and concurring opinion of Garff, J.)
(discussing the dangers posed by no-knock nighttime search
warrants), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991).

The unique

threats posed by no-knock nighttime search warrants call for intense
judicial review and counsel against deference to the magistrates.
See State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 739-740 (Utah App.)(Garff, J.,
concurring)("[W]henever a 'canned,7 or pre-printed affidavit is
presented to a magistrate, he or she has an affirmative
responsibility to scrutinize the factual circumstances justifying
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the search warrant.

Conclusory or ambiguous statements in the

affidavit are insufficient.

This is particularly critical when the

warrant authorizes nighttime intrusion into a person's home."),
cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991); State v. Buck, 756 P.2d
700, 703-04 (Utah 1988)(Zimmerman, J., concurring)(explaining the
need for judicial scrutiny of no-knock searches).
Neutral and detached assessment, and thorough review of
affidavits seeking no-knock nighttime search warrants are crucial.
The serious need for independent evaluation of affidavits seeking
no-knock nighttime search warrants is demonstrated by the testimony
of the detective who drafted the affidavit successfully obtaining a
no-knock nighttime search warrant in this case:
Last nighttime I did, someone got killed, and he
was supposed to be asleep. So vou take your best
pick. I firmly believe it's safer at night if
there's going to be violence.
(T. 29)(emphasis added).

It is important to note that the dangers

posed by no-knock nighttime searches threaten police officers and
other innocent people.

When Detective McCarthy indicated that

no-knock searches are safer for police and innocent people, the
trial court responded,
I find that absolutely amazing[.] ... [I]f
you kick down somebody's door in the middle of
the night, and you're not in uniform, and I
assume swat teams are in their black uniforms,
and have police on the back, and not on the
front[.] ...
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But you7re going in in the dark, and you have
flashlights, maybe you have flashlights, maybe
you don't[.]
•• • •

And now that's safer, breaking into somebody's
house, kicking down their door in the middle of
the night, when you don't know who's in there?
There could be somebody in there with their
family and little children. Why isn't the person
in there entitled to think, well, here comes a
bunch of crazy people that are going to kill and
rape my family, and take action? Why is that
safer for a police officer? Looks to me like
you're just asking to get shot?
(R. 67-68).
Numerous Utah cases have recognized that it is appropriate
for Utah courts to decide search and seizure cases on the basis of
independent Utah law.

See Allen v. Lindbeck, 93 P.2d 920 (Utah

1939)(decided under Article I section 14; striking statute
purporting to allow search warrant affidavits based on the belief of
the affiant, rather than stating the underlying facts).

See also

State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991); State v. LaRocco, 794
P.2d 460, 465-473 (Utah 1990) (plurality) ; State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d
188, 192-93 (Utah 1986); State v. Hvqh. 711 P.2d 264, 272 (Utah
1985)(Zimmerman, J., concurring).
Because federal deference to magistrates undercuts
important rights established by Article I section 14 of the Utah
Constitution and is improper in the context of the Utah statutory
scheme, this Court should hold that affidavits in support of the
no-knock nighttime search warrants are reviewed for probable cause,
without deference to the magistrates.
Article I section 14.
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Constitution of Utah,

II.
THE AFFIDAVIT DOES NOT PROVIDE PROBABLE CAUSE
OR A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE
NO-KNOCK NIGHTTIME SEARCH WARRANT.
A. THE AFFIDAVIT DOES NOT SHOW PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE SEARCH, OR A
SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WARRANT.
1. Search warrant affidavits must provide sufficient facts from
which a magistrate may make an independent finding of probable cause.
This Court set forth the federal law on how a magistrate is
to assess search warrant affidavits for probable cause, in State v.
Weaver, 817 P.2d 830 (1991), explaining,
Probable cause is to be determined by the
totality of the circumstances. Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317,
2332-33 (1983).
Under this analysis, the magistrate must
"make a practical, common-sense decision whether,
given all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit before him, including the 'veracity7
and basis of knowledge of persons supplying
hearsay information, there is a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place." Gates, 462 U.S. at
238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332.
Id. at 832-33 (citations omitted).
It is important to note that the Utah Supreme Court has
recognized that the Gates "totality of the circumstances" test has
not wholly supplanted the Aguilar-Spinelli test in the evaluation of
affidavits baised on information provided by informants.

For

instance, in State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985), the court
stated,
[I]n State v. Bailey, [675 P.2d 1203 (Utah
1984),] we observed that even under the Gates
"totality of the circumstances" standard,
compliance with the Aguilar-Spinelli guidelines
might be necessary to establish the requisite
"fair probability" that the evidence sought
actually exists and can be found where the
-14-

informant so states. However, in other cases, "a
less strong showing of the basis of the affiant's
knowledge, veracity and reliability may be
required, if the circumstances as a whole
indicate that the informant's report is
truthful." rBailey, at 1205-06].
Id. at 1101-02 (footnotes omitted).

When the totality of

circumstances indicates the truthfulness of the informant's report,
the showing of the informant's basis of knowledge and veracity and
reliability may be "less strong," but there must still be some
showing of each of these things.

Id.

Affidavits relying on police informants, rather than named
citizen informants, logically require heightened scrutiny.

In State

v. Treadway, 499 P.2d 846 (Utah 1972), the court explained, "Recent
case law has acknowledged that a different rationale exists for
establishing the reliability of named citizen informers as opposed
to unnamed police informers, who are frequently criminals.

Those in

the latter category often proffer information in exchange for some
concession, payment, or simply out of revenge against the subject;
under such circumstances, it is proper to demand some evidence of
their credibility or reliability."
deleted).

Id. at 848 (emphasis added and

The court indicated that the testimony of police

informers is viewed with "rigid scrutiny."

Jd.

Accord State v.

Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 286-287 and n.4 (Utah App. 1990)(police
informant testimony may require showing of "veracity, reliability,
and basis of knowledge" if circumstances do not "readily indicate
the truthfulness of the informant.").
Search warrant affidavits must provide sufficient factual
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allegations for the magistrate to make an independent factual
assessment of probable cause.

Our state supreme court recognized

the importance of the exercise of independent factual assessment by
magistrates in Allen v. Lindbeck, 93 P.2d 920 (Utah 1939).

Acting

under Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution, the court
struck a statute authorizing the issuance of search warrants on the
basis of the affiant's belief of facts, stating,
"A warrant to search and seize, which follows
upon a statement based solely upon the belief of
the affiant, rests upon the reasoning of the
affiant, based upon the secret facts of which he
may have knowledge, and the conclusion which
results from such reasoning is affiant's, not
that of the judicial officer. The judicial
process to ascertain probable cause is then
transferred from the judicial officer to the
affiant. The Constitution permits no such thing."
Id. at 924-925 (citation omitted).
Numerous other cases decided under federal law have
recognized thctt, in the absence of sufficient factual bases in
search warrant affidavits, magistrates cannot act with the requisite
detachment and neutrality in issuing search warrants.

See

Giordanello v., United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486-87 (1958) (arrest
warrant); Acruilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109, 111-14 (1964);
Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933) ; Illinois v.
Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983).
Evidence seized under warrants obtained by magistrates7
11

rubber stamping" of "barebones" affidavits must be suppressed; the

"good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply when
the police proceed on the basis of such affidavits and warrants.
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State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303, 1304-05 (Utah App. 1989); State
v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730, 738 (Utah App. 1991), cert, granted. 817 P.2d
327 (Utah 1991).

2. The affidavit is inadequate to show probable cause for the
search, or a substantial basis for the issuance of the warrant.
Certain fundamental problems apparent on the face of the
search warrant and affidavit indicate that, in issuing the no-knock
nighttime search warrant without further clarification, the
magistrate was acting as a rubber stamp for Detective McCarthy,
rather than as a neutral and detached arbiter of probable cause.
The following flaws in the affidavit and warrant demonstrate a lack
of probable cause, and a lack of a substantial basis for the
issuance of the warrant.
The first problem with the warrant and affidavit is that
they are ambiguous about whether the warrant authorizes search of
the entire duplex, or just the southern portion of the duplex with
the 3720 address.

The warrant authorizes no-knock nighttime search

of
the premises known as a 3720 South 3 375 West, the
duplex on the west side of the road, 3720 is the
southern most half of the duplex, the apartment
to the north has the numbers 3718 on the front of
the premises, to include all containers, rooms,
attics, and basements found therein.
(R. 25). The search warrant affidavit contains this same
description (R. 28). All references in the portions of the
affidavit relating to the probable cause showing and justifications
for the no-knock nighttime issuance of the warrant are to "the
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premises" and are not specific to the entire duplex, or to a
particular half of the duplex.

The magistrate could easily have

corrected this ambiguity on the face of the no-knock nighttime
warrant, but apparently overlooked it, unnecessarily risking fatal
consequences to presumably innocent citizens.

The failure of the

warrant to precisely identify the place to be search violates
numerous statutory and constitutional provisions.

Utah Code Ann.

section 77-23-1 (1990 Repl. Vol.)("A search warrant is an order
issued by a magistrate in the name of the state and directed to a
peace officer, describing with particularity the thing, place or
person to be searched and the property or evidence to be seized by
him and brought before the magistrate*")(emphasis added); Utah Code
Ann. section 77-23-3(1) ("A search warrant shall not issue except
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation particularly
describing the person or place to be searched and the person,
property, or evidence to be seized.")(emphasis added); Constitution
of Utah, Article I section 14 (fl[N]o warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized.")(emphasis added); United States Constitution, Amendment
Four (fl[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.11).
The second facial deficiency in the affidavit is that it
permits a search for evidence when there was no probable cause as to
the residents of the premises to be searched, without demonstrating

-18-

the need for, and without limiting the invasion of, those people7s
rights.

Utah Code Ann. section 77-2 3-3 creates statutory

requirements that when the police have no probable cause as to the
people in possession of property subject to seizure, the warrant may
not issue without the magistrate's specific findings of conditions
precedent, and that the magistrate must narrow the warrant to limit
intrusion on the rights of those who are not probable cause
suspects.

It states in subsection (2) as follows:

(2) If the item sought to be seized is
evidence of illegal conduct and is in the
possession of a person or entity for which there
is insufficient probable cause shown to the
magistrate to believe that such person or entity
is a party to the alleged illegal conduct, no
search warrant shall issue except upon a finding
by the magistrate that the evidence sought to be
seized cannot be obtained by subpoena or that
such evidence would be concealed, destroyed,
damaged, or altered if sought by subpoena. If
such a finding is made and a search warrant
issued, the magistrate shall direct upon the
warrant such conditions that reasonably afford
protection of the following interests of the
person or entity in possession of such evidence:
(a) Protection against unreasonable
interference with normal business; or
(b) Protection against the loss or
disclosure of protected confidential sources of
information; or
(c) Protection against prior or direct
restraints on constitutionally protected rights.
In the instant case, the affidavit does not allege the
identity of any probable cause suspects, but authorizes the search
of an occupied home for evidence therein.

The warrant contains no

finding that "the evidence sought to be seized cannot be obtained by
subpoena or that such evidence would be concealed, destroyed,
damaged, or altered if sought by subpoena."
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The warrant contains no

restrictions protecting the no-probable-cause-occupants'
constitutionally protected rights, but instead authorizes the most
intrusive and dangerous of searches —

a no-knock nighttime search.

The aiffidavit fails to make an adequate showing of the
reliability, veracity and basis of knowledge of the confidential
informants.

Other than the allegations concerning Detective

McCarthy's perception that the vehicular traffic at the premises to
be searched Wcis consistent with drug trafficking, the affidavit
relies exclusively on information from three confidential informants
(the first source, the second source, and the second family
member)(R. 3 0-3 3).

None of the confidential informants had

witnessed any drug transactions inside the premises to be searched
(R. 3 0-3 3).

In asserting that the spouse had admitted to the first

source and the second family member that the premises to be searched
was his source for cocaine (R. 30-33), the affidavit presents
hearsay on hearsay.

The affidavit does not establish any prior

experience between these sources and Detective McCarthy to establish
their reliability and veracity.

The affidavit indicates that the

first source is reliable, in part because the source had not been
promised or paid anything, but the affidavit makes no such averment
about the second source and the second family member (R. 31). This
information from the confidential informants fails to demonstrate
probable cause.

See State v. Bailey, supra (requiring a showing of

confidential informants' veracity, reliability and basis of
knowledge to establish probable cause).
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B. THE AFFIDAVIT DID NOT JUSTIFY THE ISSUANCE OF THE NO-KNOCK
NIGHTTIME WARRANT.
1. Search warrant affidavits seeking no-knock nighttime search
warrants must meet specific criteria.
No-knock nighttime searches involve severe dangers to
searching officers and others inside or near the premises to be
searched, extreme intrusion into the privacy and solitude of the
home, and the destruction of property.

See State v. Rowe. 806 P.2d

730, 734 n.5, 738-40, and nn.10 and 11, (Utah App.)(main opinion and
concurring opinion of Garff, J.)(discussing the dangers posed by
no-knock nighttime search warrants), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327
(Utah 1991); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306-08, 313 n.12
(1958)(interpreting federal knock and announce statute); LaFave,
Search and Seizure, § 4.8(a) at 272-273; State v. Buck. 756 P.2d
700, 701 (Utah 1988).

No-knock nighttime searches have met with

judicial disfavor throughout the history of the United States.

See

Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498-500 (1958); Miller v.
United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
Because of the dangers historically recognized in no-knock
nighttime searches, magistrates are to proceed with caution in
evaluating search warrant affidavits seeking no-knock nighttime
search warrants.

See State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 739-740 (Utah

App.)(Garff, J., concurring)("[W]henever a 'canned,' or pre-printed
affidavit is presented to a magistrate, he or she has an affirmative
responsibility to scrutinize the factual circumstances justifying
the search warrant.

Conclusory or ambiguous statements in the

affidavit are insufficient.

This is particularly critical when the
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warrant authorizes nighttime intrusion into a person's home."),
cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991); State v. Buck. 756 P.2d
700, 703-04 (Utah 1988)(Zimmerman, J., concurring)(explaining the
need for judicial scrutiny of no-knock searches).
Even when no-knock nighttime search warrants are issued in
compliance with pertinent statutes, the searches still must meet
constitutional standards of reasonableness.

See Ker v. California.

374 U.S. 23, 39 (1963); United States v. Mitchell, 783 F.2d 971,
973-74 (10th Cir.), cert, denied. 479 U.S. 860 (1986); Bovance v.
Mvers. 398 F.2d 896, 899 (3d Cir. 1968); State v. Lindner. 592 P.2d
852, 858 (Idaho 1979), LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 4.7(b) 264-267;
State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 739 n.ll (Utah App.), cert, granted,
817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991).

2. The search warrant affidavit does not justify a no-knock warrant.
Undei: Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-10(2), in order to issue
a no-knock warrant, the magistrate must have facts in the affidavit
or supplemented record which provide "proof, under oath, that the
object of the search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or
secreted, or that physical harm may result to any person if notice
were given.11 (Emphasis added).

The requirement of "proof, under

oath" in the no-knock statute is stronger than the "probable cause"
or "reasonable cause" showings that must be made prior to the
general issuance of search warrants and the issuance of nighttime
Wcirrants.

This strong statutory language is consistent with

judicial recognition of the dangers and destruction involved in
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no-knock searches, discussed supra.
The affidavit fails to demonstrate the statutory
prerequisite to the issuance of a no-knock warrant, that "the object
of the search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or
that physical harm may result to any person if notice were given."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10(2).
The first basis for the no-knock warrant proferred in the
affidavit is as follows: "Your affiant firmly believes it always
safer for all participants, police officers, participants and
non-participants to the sales operation if the officers have the
safety of an unannounced entry." (R. 32). As the Utah Supreme Court
established in Lindbeck, supra, affidavits based on the belief of
the affiant and failing to show the underlying facts do not allow
for independent evaluation by the magistrate, and warrant issuing on
the basis of such warrants violate Article I section 14 of the Utah
Constitution.1

1. After questioning the logic of Detective McCarthy's
testimony that no-knock nighttime warrants are the safest in drug
cases (T. 66-74), and despite the detective's testimony that someone
was killed during the detective's most recent experience involving a
nighttime warrant T. 29), the trial court concluded that the court
had no expertise in the execution of no-knock warrants, and deferred
to the testimony of the detective that safety compelled the issuance
of the no-knock warrant (R. 67-68). In so ruling, the trial court
failed to provide an independent review of the issuance of the
no-knock warrant, and overlooked a wealth of case law recognizing
the extremely dangerous and instrusive nature of no-knock warrants
and the need for careful scrutiny of affidavits in support of such
warrants. See State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 734 n.5, 738-40, and
nn.10 and 11, (Utah App.)(main opinion and concurring opinion of
Garff, J.)(discussing the dangers posed by no-knock nighttime search
(footnote continues)
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The second basis for the no-knock warrant proferred in the
affidavit is as follows: "Your affiant has been on numerous
narcotics search warrants w[h]ere weapons have been readily
available to the occupants.

Further your affiant knows from

training and experience that more and more narcotics dealers are
arming themselves to protect the sales operations from other
dealers/users." (R. 32-33).

This allegation is too general to

constitute "proof under oath" that harm would result from
announcement of the execution of the warrant.
§77-23-10(2).

Utah Code Ann.

All people protected by the Utah Constitution are

entitled to keep and bear arms, Constitution of Utah, Article I
section 6, and the exercise of this right by some people in the
Detective's experience is no basis for risking a no-knock search
upon the residence of people where drug paraphernalia may be found,
particularly in the absence of any facts specific to the residents
of the home relating to the paraphernalia or weapons.

(footnote 1 continued)
warrants), cert. granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991); Miller v. United
States. 357 U.S. 301, 306-08, 313 n.12 (1958)(interpreting federal
knock and announce statute); LaFave, Search and Seizure.
section 4.8(a) at 272-273; State v. Buck. 756 P.2d 700, 701 (Utah
1988); Jones v. United States. 357 U.S. 493, 498-500 (1958); and
Miller v. United States. 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
More importantly, in assessing the propriety of the
no-knock nighttime search warrant, the court should have focused on
the affidavit, rather than the detective's testimony. See
generally. Rowe.
In any event, it appears that in assessing the propriety of
the issuance of a no-knock nighttime search warrant, this Court
simply reviews the affidavit, and does not review the analysis of
the trial court. See Rowe.
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As the third basis for the issuance of the no-knock
warrant, the affidavit alleges, "Further the supplier at the named
premises has passed along threats to the spouse about police
intervention in the illicit operation." (R. 33). As reference to
the entire affidavit reflects, the threats were from the dealer to
the spouse, and from the spouse to the first confidential informant,
and were unspecified inducements not to report the drugs to the
police (R. 31 55 1 and 2).

These threats demonstrate only that the

drug source did not want the spouse to report the drugs, and that
the spouse did not want the first confidential source to report the
drugs, and do not constitute "proof under oath" that harm would
result from the announcement of the search.

Utah Code Ann.

§77-23-10(2).
The final basis for the issuance of the no-knock warrant
states, "Lastly the property being sought pursuant to this
warrant/affidavit is very easily destroyed." (R. 33). The warrant
in this case did not seek authorization for seizure of narcotics,
but only for other evidence of possession and intent to distribute
narcotics, such as drug paraphernalia (R. 29). Because this
evidence is not at risk of being quickly destroyed or hidden, it did
not provide a basis for the no-knock warrant.

See Rowe at 733-734

n.3 ("A more particularized showing may well be required if, for
example, a large quantity of drugs is sought.

In such cases, as

where the affiant has information of the ongoing cultivation or
manufacture of drugs, the exigency of ready destructability,
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inherent with small quantities of drugs, may not be present.11).2

3. The search warrant affidavit does not justify a nighttime warrant.
Under Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-5(1), in order to issue
a nighttime warrant, the magistrate must have facts in the affidavit
or supplemental record which provide "a reasonable cause to believe
a search is necessary in the night to seize the property prior to it
being concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered, or for other good
reason[.]"

Under the current statute, it is not enough for the

issuance of the nighttime warrant to show that the evidence is
likely to be present at night; there must be a reason why the search
must occur at night, rather than during the day.

State v. Rowe. 806

P.2d 730, 733 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991);
LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 4.7(b) 2 64 and n.20.
The affidavit fails to demonstrate the statutory
prerequisite to the issuance of a nighttime warrant, that "a search
is necessary in the night to seize the property prior to it being
concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered, or for other good
reason[.]fl

Utah Code Ann. §77-23-5(1).

There is nothing in the

2. In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court ruled
that the no-knock warrant was justified, in part because, "of the
potential of the detsruction of evidence, particularly where small
amounts may be involved[. ]!l (R. 67). This portion of the trial
court's ruling was clearly erroneous inasmuch as the warrant was not
seeking drugs, but was seeking such items as paraphernalia,
residency records, currency and packaging supplies.
In any event, it appears that this Court need not address
the trial court's analysis, but may simply assess the adequacy of
the affidavit. See Rowe.
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affidavit explaining why the premises to be searched had to be
searched at night, rather than in the day.

As previously discussed,

the evidence to be seized was not evanescent, and there is nothing
to indicate that its seizure was more necessary at night than in the
day.

The affidavit itself indicates that drug trafficking allegedly

had occurred as late as 2:00 a.m. at the premises to be searched (R.
31) , thus counselling against the nighttime search.

See State v.

Rowe. 806 P.2d 730f 734 n.4 (Utah App. 1991)("For example, if the
supporting affidavit made a particularized showing that drugs were
likely to be sold or consumed over the course of the night and
evidence thereby lost, or that the supply was likely to be
imminently moved en masse to a different location during the night,
or that a safer search was likely at night because the house was
abustle with activity during the day and no one but the occupant was
likely to be home at night, then the propriety of a nighttime search
becomes manifest.

We caution that a mere incantation of such

circumstances will not justify a nighttime search—the required
factual showing is not one which is conducive, for example, to
pre-printed language.")(emphasis added), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327
(Utah 1991).

See generally Rowe; State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303

(Utah App. 1989).

The fact that the SWAT team who executed this

warrant without Detective McCarthy saw fit to do so in the daytime
demonstrates that the nighttime search was not necessary or
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appropriate (T. 20-23).3

III.
SUPPRESSION IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY.
The violations in this case are substantive and require
suppression.

The affidavit and warrant are too vague to support a

finding of probable cause to search, particularly in a no-knock
nighttime manner, and constitute violations of the fourth amendment
of the United States Constitution and Article I section 14 of the
Utah Constitution.
Because the magistrate issued a no-knock nighttime search
warrant without an affidavit or supplementation of the affidavit
that meets the statutory and constitutional muster, suppression is
the appropriate remedy.

Rowe at 738.

The legislature did not

indicate that violations of the no-knock and nighttime statutes
should be exempt from suppression.

Compare Utah Code Ann. section

77-23-6 ("Failure to give or leave a receipt shall not render the
evidence seized inadmissible at trial.") with Utah Code Ann. section
77-23-10(2)(no-knock statute; does not prohibit suppression), and
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-5(1)(nighttime statute; does not

3. The trial court did not reach the merits of the
nighttime aspect of the warrant, ruling that the fact that the SWAT
team exectuted the warrant during the day mooted or cured the
defective warrant (R. 68). In so ruling, the trial court failed to
appreciate the importance of meaningful assessment of affidavits
seeking no-knock nighttime search warrants, and the crucial role of
judicial review in the enforcement of fundamental rights to
privacy. See appendix to State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 740-743 (Utah
App. 1991), cert, granted. 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991).
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prohibit suppression).4
Given the state constitutional rights to life, privacy,
property and the proper issuance of warrants, which are all at stake
in no-knock nighttime search cases, suppression is the appropriate
remedy for the improper issuance of no-knock nighttime search
warrants.

See Constitution of Utah, Article I section 1 ("All men

have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their
lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property[.]");
Article I section 7 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law."); Article I section 14
("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized."); State v.
LaRocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465-73 (Utah 1990)(plurality)(adopting
exclusionary rule under Article I section 14 of the Utah
Constitution, and reserving judgment on whether or not the court
will adopt exceptions to the Utah exclusionary rule).

4. Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-12 indicates that "property
or evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant may not be
suppressed at a motion, trial, or other proceedings unless the
unlawful conduct of the peace officer is shown to be substantial,"
but it appears that this statute, which is part of the Fourth
Amendment Enforcement Act, is no longer in effect, inasmuch as the
Utah Supreme Court struck as unconstitutional a different provision
of the Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act, and the act indicates that
the provisions are not severable, but fall together if one provision
is stricken. See State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 186 (Utah 1987).
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The federal "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule
has not been and should not be adopted under the exclusionary rule
of Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
737-738 and appendix to Rowe opinion at 740-743.

See Rowe at
Even if the "good

faith" exception could be applied in this state, it does not apply
in this case because no officer could rely in good faith on the
barebones affidavit at issue here.

See Rowe at 738 (good faith

exception does not apply when magistrate acts as a rubber stamp).

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the trial court,s denial of
Mr. White's motion to suppress and remand this case to the trial
court for further proceedings.
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APPENDIX 1

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Amendment XIV to the Constitution of the United states provides:
Sectd on 1.
Al] persons born or natural ized I n the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and ot
the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shal 1 abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of 1 ife, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protect! on of the laws,
Section 2.
Representatives shall be appor tioned among
the several States according to their respective
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But
when the right to vote at any election for the
choice of electors for President and
Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congressr the Executive and
Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of
the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the
male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one
years of age, and citizens of the United States,
or in any way abridged, except for participati on
in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in the
proportion which the number of such male citizens
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age i n such State.
Sect:!
_ erson shal 1 be a Senator or
Representative in Congress, or el ector of
President and Vice President, or hold any offi ce,
civi 1 or in i litary, under the United States, or
under any State, who, having previously taken an
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer
of the United States, or as a member of any State
legislature or as an executive or judicial
officer of any State, to support the Const it lit ion
of the United States, shall have engaged in
insurrection, or rebellion against the same or
given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. Hint
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each
House, remove such disability.

Section 4.
The validity of the public debt of the
United States, authorized by law, including debts
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for
services in suppressing insurrection or
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither
the United States nor any State shall assume or
pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of
insurrection or rebellion against the United
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation
of any slave; but all such debts, obligations,
and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5.
The Congress shall have power to enforce,
b
Y appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article.
Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
All men have the inherent and inalienable
right to enjoy and defend their lives and
liberties; to acquire, possess and protect
property; to worship according to the dictates of
their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest
against wrongs, and petition for redress of
grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts
and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of
that right.
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law.
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—
Issuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.

Utah Code •?
pertinent part:

.__,„•--.

.. ~jpp.) provides in

7 7 - 1 3. De£Initions.
For the purpose of this act:
.»*.]. -Mare'* means a justice of
the Supreme Courr o -H;*^ if the district
courts, a judge ol the juvenile courts, a
judge cf the circuit courts and a justice of
the ea<:o - r : " -•(( r *n_ coin: t created by

.,

"l ' o 1 ) provides:

search warrant11 defined.
-. *rch warrant is an order issued by a
naq -; :i in the name of the state and directed
to J peao~ crficer, describing with particularity
the thing, place or person to be searched and the
property or evidence to be seized by him and
brought before the magistrate.
77-<*

Utah Code Ann

sect i on 7 7 -2 3 - 2 (1990 Pep1. Vo1.) prov ides:

77- 23-2. Grounds for issuance.
Property or evidence may be seized pursuant
to a search warrant Ir 4 } ;ere * s probable cause to
believe that "t*
.i.lawi •
unlawfully possessed

1

i of in I red oi

is

(2) Has been used or is possessed for
the purpose of being used to commit or
conceal the commission of an offense; or
(' Is evi dence of illegal conduct.
ill (ill i o d e

i, ni i mi ni

.i»< I i o n

, 1

I i I i MI

" )

provides:

77-23-3. Conditions precedent : issuance.
(1) A search warrant shall not issue except
upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation particularly describing the person or
place to be searched and the person, property or
evidence to be seized,
i£ the item sought to be seized i s
o in II
i in i» of illegal conduct and i s in the
pUooLSsion of a person or entity for which tl lere
is insufficient probable cause shown to the
magistrate to nelieve that such person or entity

is a party to the alleged illegal conduct, no
search warrant shall issue except upon a finding
by the magistrate that the evidence sought to be
seized cannot be obtained by subpoena or that
such evidence would be concealed, destroyed,
damaged, or altered if sought by subpoena. If
such a finding is made and a search warrant
issued, the magistrate shall direct upon the
warrant such conditions that reasonably afford
protection of the following interests of the
person or entity in possession of such evidence:
(a) Protection against unreasonable
interference with normal business; or
(b) Protection against the loss or
disclosure of protected confidential sources
of information; or
(c) Protection against prior or direct
restraints on constitutionally protected
rights.
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-4 (1990 Repl. Vol.) provides in
pertinent part:
77-23-4. Examination of complainant and
witnesses—Witness not in physical presence of
magistrate—Duplicate original warrants—Return.
(1) All evidence to be considered by a
magistrate in the issuance of a search
warrant shall be given on oath and either
reduced to writing or recorded verbatim.
Transcription of the recorded testimony need
not precede the issuance of the warrant.
Any person having standing to contest the
search may request and shall be provided
with a transcription of the recorded
testimony in support of the application for
the warrant.
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-5 (1990 Repl. Vol.) provides in
pertinent part:
77-23-5. Time for service—Officer may request
assistance.
(1) The magistrate must insert a direction
in the warrant that it be served in the daytime,
unless the affidavits or oral testimony state a
reasonable cause to believe a search is necessary
in the night to seize the property prior to it
being concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered,
or for other good reason; in which case he may

insert a direction that it be served any time of
the day or night. An officer may request other
persons to ass i st h i m in conducts ng the search.
Utah
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provides:

77-23-6. Receipt for property taken.
When the officer seizes property pursuant to
a search warrant, he shall give a receipt to the
person from, whom i t was seized or in whose
possession it was found. If no person is
present, the officer shall leave the receipt in
the place where he found the property. Failure
to give or leave a receipt shall not render the
evidence sei zed i nadmissible at trj a ]
Ldi: Jode Ann MM:1! IUIII /' " ,'" I III | 111"' i" MI l < v p l
pertinent part :

'i Il )i p N i v j i i t ' i ; i n

77-23-10. Force used in executing warrant
Notice of authority prerequisite, when.
When a search warrant has been issued
authorizing entry into any building, room,
conveyance, compartment or other enclosure, the
officer executing the warrant nay use such force
as is reasonably necessary to enter:
(2) Wi thout notice of his authority
an(^ purpose, if the magistrate issuing the
warrant directs in the warrant that the
officer need not give noti ce , The
magistrate shall so direct only upon proof,
under oath, that the object of the search
may be quickly destroyed,, di sposed of, or
secreted, or that physical harm may result
to any person if notice were gi
ven.

APPENDIX 2

SEARCH WARRANT AND AFFIDAVIT

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT n UJRT
T

I I.I MINT i •

I A IE OF UTAH

SEARCH WARRANT
NO
ONTY I'E' MVP LAM.', IVTA'IK ij].1 UTAH
any peace officer in n.he state of Utah.
Dof by affidavit; under oath having been made this day before me by L)et,
II McCarthy, 1 am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe
( | un z\v\ peri'jonu or
{ ) in th*j, vehicles described as
(X) on the premises known as a 3720' SOUTH 3375 WEST, the duplex on
i west side of the road, 3 720 is the southern most half of the duplex, the
irtment to the north has the numbers 3718 on the front of the premises, to
rlude all containers, rooms, attics, and basements found therein.

it

In the City of WEST VALLEY, County of Salt Lake, State of Otah, there
now being possessed or concealed certain property or evidence described
SEE' Al TACHMENT "A"
ch property or evidence:
(x) was un lawfully a c c u s e - or is unlawfully possessed or
(x) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense- (x) is being possessed with the purpose to use i*. as ~ -•-••committing or concealing a public offense or
(x) consist of an item or constitutes evidence of
possessed by a party to the. illegal conduct

, t,

are therefore commanded:
". * a:
. ••
*
:ood cause having been sho1 vn)
\ , execute witnout notice of authority or purpose,.
proof under oath being snown that the object of th i. b
sear: . ~ ^ , i U ^ : : K 2 ^ >- r *~royed or disposed of or
t'l• * f 1" person If notice, were given.)

i I ll ,l ^ \

ITEMS TO BE SEIZED
SEARCH WARRANT/AFFIDAVIT
CONTINUED
ATTACHMENT "A"
1. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SCALES,
PLASTIC BAGGIES, TAPE, PAPER BINDLES CUT INTO SQUARES.
2. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SYRINGES,
BENT SPOONS, COTTON BALLS, MIRRORS, RAZOR BLADES, SHORT STRAWS,
PIPES FOR SMOKING COCAINE, GLASSWARE USED TO MAKE CRACK COCAINE,
CUT MATERIAL, MARIJUANA PIPES, ROLLING PAPERS AND BONGS.
3. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, UTILITY
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES.
4. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE NARCOTICS
BEING SEARCHED FOR.
5. NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PRICE
LIST, AMOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, AND
ESPECIALLY DRUG INDEBTNESS.

Nd02o

3E TWO
\RCH WARRANT
make a search of the above-named or described person (s), vehicle(s) , and
»mises for the herein-above described property or evidence and if you find
i same or any part thereof to bring it forthwith before me at the Third
cuit Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Dtah, or retain such property in
x custody, subject to the order of this court.
EN UNDER MY HAND and dated this

y /

day of

^^^,1991.

^ -rz

JUDGE, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OR
MAGISTRATE OF THE 3RD CIRCUIT COURT

UU027

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
IN AND FOR THE SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake

)

: ss
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
BEFORE:
JUDGE

ADDRESS

The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he has reason to believe
That

( ) on the person of
( ) in the vehicle described as
(X) on the premises known as 3720 SOUTH 33 75 WEST, the
duplex on the west side of the road, 3720 is the southern most half
of the duplex, the apartment to the north has the numbers 3718 on
the front of the premises, to include all containers, rooms, attics
and basements found therein.
In the City of West Valley, County of Salt Lake, State of
Utah, there is now certain property of evidence described as:
SEE ATTACHMENT "A"
and that said property or evidence:
(X)
(X)
(X)

was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or
has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or
is being possessed with he purpose to use it as a means
of committing or concealing a public offense; or
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct;
( ) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to
the illegal conduct, (Note requirements of Utah Code
Annotated, 77-23-3(2)

Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is
evidence of the crime(s) of possession of a controlled substance,
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute.

i>0028

ITEMS TO BE SEIZED
SEARCH WARRANT/AFFIDAVIT
CONTINUED
ATTACHMENT "A"
1. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SCALES,
PLASTIC BAGGIES, TAPE, PAPER BINDLES CUT INTO SQUARES.
2. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SYRINGES,
BENT SPOONS, COTTON BALLS, MIRRORS, RAZOR BLADES, SHORT STRAWS,
PIPES FOR SMOKING COCAINE, GLASSWARE USED -TO MAKE CRACK COCAINE,
CUT MATERIAL, MARIJUANA PIPES, ROLLING PAPERS AND BONGS.
3. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, UTILITY
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES.
4. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE NARCOTICS
BEING SEARCHED FOR.
5. NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PRICE
LIST, AMOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, AND
ESPECIALLY DRUG INDEBTNESS.

PAGE TWO
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
The facts to establish the grounds tor issuance ot a Search
Warrant are:
Your affiant, Detective Bill McCarthy, 8022, is employed by
the West Valley City Police Department. Your affiant was assigned
to the Metro Narcotics Strike Force for a period of over three
years. Your affiant is presently assigned to the West Valley City
Police Department, Detective Division, and is assigned to
investigate narcotic related offenses occurring within West Valley
City.
Your affiant has had training in narcotics identification and
in the investigation of narcotics related offenses. Affiant has
personally purchased various narcotics on numerous occasions in
relation to police investigations. Affiant was assigned to the
Metro Narcotics Strike Force for over 3 years. Your affiant is a
certified peace officer in the State of Utah for over 10 years.
Your affiant's specialized training includes the DEA basic and
advanced investigators seminars, as well as the California
Narcotics Officers Association seminars in drug recognition,
identification and investigative techniques and Alcohol Tobacco and
Firearms Undercover Investigative Techniques.
Further your affiant would like to inform the courts that your
affiant has been the affiant or has assisted in the preparation and
service of several hundred narcotic search warrants. Also several
of those search warrants were surveillance search warrants.
Your affiant had received information from a confidential
informant that the suspects at the listed address are dealing in
narcotics. Your affiant believes that the information provided by
the CI

is

r^yr^tfii

rtnrl t r u t h f u l
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1-Ko fnl 1 riT.rvmj- i

h.ing _ Thg CI

information^j_g f:i ^s£-.hanri ^and from personal observations j Further
/the CI has no&^pf&mised nor paiH anything for the Information
provided. Lastly your affiant has corroborated the information
provided by the CI from a separate source.
Your affiant was told by the CI that the persons residing at
the premises listed are trafficking in narcotics. The CI basis this
belief on the following. The CI reports that over the last 6 months
the CI's spouse has been purchasing cocaine from the listed
premises. Further the CI has been to the named premises on at least
two occasions when the CI's spouse did ii^^^cjL^Tii^chase cocaine.
The most recent purchase being withinrtHe" .last 5 days^Your affiant
was further told by the CI that the ci Ras never been inside the
named premises and actually observed a transaction, however the CI
has observed th€> CI's spouse enter then "5X11, trie named premisesT
AfirSr the CI's has exitea "f5e named premises the CI has observed
the^jigLause ingest cocaine. Further the spouse has indicated to the
CI that the persons inside the named prpmisfts—ajM—the—spouses
supplier of cocaine.
__
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' (VPAGE THREE
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
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CI told your affiant that the CI has been threatened by the
spouse if the CI came forward to the police with the information
provided. Further the CI was told by the spouse that the supplier
of—the r-nr^inp h a g ^ h ^ 0 ^ op^d thp sprm<^<*-wfren^the spouse has seen!
late in repaying for cocaine that was received^by ttrer spouse.
Your affiant has interviewed a second source of information
who has observed the spouse at the pained premises. Your affiant was
also told by the second source' that the spouse has a long history
of substance abuse, cocaine. Your affiant cannot disclose the
identity of the CI nor the second source for fear it would
jeopardize each real identity to the supplier. Further your affiant
was told by the CI that the CI has been threatened by the spouse
that the supplier would "get even" if the CI went to the police.
Your affianfe—b^lieves that the information from the second
sourcer^Ts accur^rte^ahd truthful for the following reasons. The
sources information ±s first hand and further the second source is
a ^relative of the spouse. Further your affiant has reviewed the
criminal history of the spouse and the spouse does show prior
arre^t^for narcotics..
Your affiant has been
what your affiant believes
has held surveillance on
vehicles arrive and stay a

to the named premises and has observed
to be narcotics traffic. Your affiant
the named premises and has observed
very short period of time.

Your affiant believes that the operation is ongoing for the
following reasons. The CI states to your affiant that the spouse
has been using cocaine for over 2 years. CI states that the spouse
has been purchasing cocaine from the named premises for at least
the last 6 months. The CI has observed the spouse ingest the
cocaine intravenously for over the last year. Further the CI has
been to the named premises and has observed the spouse enter then
exit the named premise with cocaine, the most recent being within
the last 5 days.
Your affiant was told by a second ramxiy member that the
spouse does have a cocaine abuse problem and further that the
spouse has been observed at the named premises, then later admitted
to have purchased cocaine at the named premises.
Lastly your affiant was told by the CI that the CI has been to
the named premises as late as 2:00 am with the spouse to purchase
peai^e. CI also tolcr^y^ur a m a m : that the spouse has inges±pri
_docdlne—«n>idtf Lhe—rrametr^premisQ-s" While purchasing additional

^uMrtrgteap^ggs^rsonainrog:
Your a f f i a n t believes t h a t the named premises should be
searched for packaging material as well as drug paraphernalia. Your

uo

PAGE FOUR
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
affiant knows from training and experience that suspect's selling
narcotics often keep instruments used in the ingestion of narcotics
on hand to allow customers to test the narcotics to be purchased.
Further your affiant knows that the packaging material is an
inherent part of any narcotics sales operation. The packaging
material is needed to weight out and package additional quantities
of, narcotics for resale.
Your affiant believes that the named premise should be
searched for US currency. Your affiant believes that the currency
will be in close proximity to the narcotics being searched for and
further that currency is evidence of the illicit operation. Honey
is needed to make change during subsequent sales and used to
replenish depleted narcotic supplies. CI also told your affiant
that the spouse has spent as much as $1,000.00 in a single day at
the named premises purchasing cocaine.
Your affiant believes that the named premises should be
searched for narcotics records. Your affiant knows from training
and experience that narcotics dealers frequently keep such list
identifying amounts sold, persons sold to, amounts owed and
especially drug indebtness. Your affiant was told that the CI's
spouse has been threatened over drug indebtness to the suppliers.
Your affiant believes that the named premises should be
searched for occupancy papers. Your affiant has checked the utility
records of the listed premises and they show in the name of
ZELENIAK, BRIAN and McCARTY, CDLLEN. Your affiant has also observed
other vehicles at the named premises and would like to identify all
the occupants for possible future prosecution.
Your affiant ask the courts not to require your affiant to
publish the name of the CI for the following reasons. The CI is a
citizen informant and your affiant fears for CI's personal safety.
Further your affiant believes if the CI's name is published,
threats that have been made against the CI will be carried out.
Your affiant prays for a night time-no knock service search
warrant. Your affiant has been told that the busiest time of\ \
operation is during the late evening hours. Your affiant was toldu
that the CI has been to the named premises as late as 2:00 am for
the purpose of purchasing cocaine.
. •
•—-—
Your affiant prays for no-knock service for the following
reasons. Your affiant firmly believes it always safer for all
participants, police officers, participants and non-participants to
the sales operation if the officers have the safety of an
unannounced entry. Your affiant has been on numerous narcotics
search warrants were weapons have been readily available to the
occupants. Further your affiant knows from training and experience ,

PAGE FIVE
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
that more and more narcotics dealers are arming themselves to
protect the sales operations from other dealers/users* Further the
supplier at the named premises has passed along threats to the
spouse about police intervention in the illicit operation. Lastly
the property being sought pursuant to this warrant/affidavit is
very easily destroyed.
Your affiant has had this warrant reviewed by a Deputy Salt
Lake County Attorney and it has been approved for presentation to
the courts.
Your affiant considers the information received from the
confidential informants reliable for the following reasons,
SEE BODY OF AFFIDAVIT
Your affiant has verified the above information from the
confidential informants to be correct and accurate through the
following independent investigation:
SEE BODY OF AFFIDAVIT
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PAGE SIX
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for
the seizure of said items:
( ) in the day time, until 7:00pm.
(X) at any time day or night because there is reason
to believe it is necessary to seize the property
prior to it being concealed, destroyed, damagedf.
or altered, or for other good reasons to wit:
SEE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN BODY OF AFFIDAVIT
It is further requested that (if appropriate) the officer
executing the requested warrant not be required to give notice of
the officer's authority or purpose because:
(X)
(X)

physical harm may result to any person if notice
were given; or
the property sought may be quicicly destroyed,
disposed of, or secreted.

This danger is believed to exist because:
SEE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN BODY OF AFFIDAVIT

FFIANT DEI. BILL MCCARTHY

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this

JS>/ day of

? Js4*-^\WL<

JUDGE
7
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
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